The paper provides new experimental evidence on the dierence between inequality aversion in the gain and in the loss domain. Incorporating loss aversion in the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and relying on a modied dictator game as proposed by Blanco et al. (2011), we demonstrate that the parameter of inequality aversion is lower when the game is framed with losses than with gains. Individuals would be less inequality averse for losses than for gains. The results also manifest that women are more inequality averse than men.
Introduction
There is large evidence that people are not only self-interested but are also concerned about the welfare of others. In a variety of economic situations, it has been shown that individuals exhibit other-regarding preferences such that concerns for fairness and reciprocity strongly motivate their decision. Several theoretical approaches have been developed to rigorously explain the observed phenomena (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) and their predictions have been conrmed by laboratory experiments in various settings (See Fehr and Fischbacher, 2006 for a review of this evidence).
Despite the large number of papers dedicated to this issue, there are few attempts to study other-regarding preferences in the loss domain. One question which has not been much explored is whether the decision frame aects a person's level of fairness.
Indeed previous research in decision making has found that individuals treat losses and gains dierently (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 1992; K®szegi and Rabin, 2006; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) . Particularly the possibility of loss aversion around a reference point has been shown to be an important phenomenon. The fact that people experience a disproportionately larger disutility from losses than from the same-sized gains has been helpful to explain a series of observed behaviors 1 .
Previous works from the literature on social psychology have shown that individuals are more own-outcome oriented in a situation where they face potential losses (Loewenstein et al., 1989; Poppe and Valkenberg, 1993; De Dreu, 1994; De Dreu et al., 1994) .
There seems to be a general tendency of inequality aversion for positively framed problems and a tendency towards inequality seeking for negative framed problems. Loss framed individuals are more concerned with maximizing their own payo and gain framed individuals are more concerned with reaching a fair distribution of outcomes. De Dreu et al.
(1994) point the role of loss aversion in explaining these results. However recent papers by Buchan et al. (2005) ; Leliveld et al. (2009) and Zhou and Wu (2011) nd evidence that fairness seem to play a dierent role when individuals face losses than when they face 1 see e.g. evidence by Kahneman and Thaler (1991) for the endowment eect, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) for the sunk-cost fallacy, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) for the equity premium puzzle, Rabin (2000) for risk aversion and small stakes or Abeler et al. (2011) for the eect of labor target earnings.
gains. Using ultimatum games these studies reveal that the size of the oers is related to strategic concerns in the gain domain, while it is related to other-regarding concerns in the loss domain.
The previous results have been obtained using ultimatum games. However, as argued by Blanco et al. (2011) , the behavior of players in ultimatum games and in dictator games is likely to be dierent due to the notion of responsibility and strategic situations. The dictator game purely measures individuals' inequality aversion in a non-strategic situation, whereas in ultimatum games players are in a strategic situation and are not purely concerned by equalizing outcomes, but rather driven by the expectations of reciprocity.
In this paper we study other-regarding preferences both when the decision making is framed with gains and losses. Relying on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion, we compare advantageous inequality aversion in the gain and in the loss frame.
Individuals experiencing advantageous inequality aversion are willing to give up something good, because it is more than someone else is getting. We follow Blanco et al. (2011) and use their modied dictator game (MDG hereafter) that we frame it either with gains or losses although keeping outcome payo equivalent. This allows us to elicit a parameter of aversion to advantageous inequality called the guilt parameter both for gains and losses.
We make theoretical predictions on the basis of the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in which we introduce a parameter of loss aversion when the dictator has to decide on how to allocate losses. The predictions are such that individuals should be more reluctant to sacrice money in order to equalize outcomes between partners when they face losses than when they face gains. Our experimental results show that loss framed individuals are less inequality averse compared to gain framed individuals. This means that loss framed individuals maximize their own outcomes while gain framed individuals are more concerned in achieving a more equal distribution of outcomes. Furthermore, the results suggest also that women are more inequality averse than men.
This paper is organized as follows. Section2 outlines the experimental design and Section 3 discusses the theoretical predictions. In Section 4 we present the results of the experiment. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
Experimental Design
We use data from two dierent experiments that were initially dedicated to another question than the one at the core of this paper (see Attanasi et al. (2016) and Lampach et al. (2016) ). From these two experiments, we retrieve data from a MDG similar to Blanco et al. (2011) . Indeed while in both experiments the subjects had to perform several other tasks, they rst start by playing a MDG presented below. The two experiments diverge according to the frame: either gains or losses. In Attanasi et al. (2016) , subjects are facing outcomes in the gain domain, we call it T G hereafter. In Lampach et al. (2016) , subjects are confronted with outcomes in the loss domain, T L hereafter.
The modied dictator game
The aim of the MDG introduced by Blanco et al. (2011) is to elicit the point prediction of the guilt parameter measuring aversion to advantageous inequality as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) .
In the gain frame treatment, the dictator has to decide about how much of the initial amount of e 10 she is willing to sacrice to the recipient in order to attain an equal distribution of outcomes. More specically, in our experiment, subjects are presented with a list of 11 pairs of payo vectors that contain the dictator and the recipient's payo. In all 11 cases, subjects have to choose sequentially one of the two payo vectors.
The left payo vector is always (e 10,e 0), that is, if this vector was chosen, the dictator would receive e 10 and the recipient nothing. The right payo contains equal outcomes varying from (e 0,e 0), (e 1,e 1) all the way to (e 10,e 10).
In the loss frame treatment, the type of decision is similar to the gain frame except that subjects decide about potential losses. To compensate for eventual losses; subjects receive an endowment of e 10. The left payo vector is always (e 0;e -10) and the right payo vector contains equal payos varying from (e -10,e -10), (e -9,e -9) throughout to (e 0,e 0). Table 1 illustrates the dierences of the payo vectors between the gain and loss frame treatments. More precisely, the task of T G compared to T L diers by the sign of the payo vectors for option "Left" and option "Right". Hence, the payo vectors in both treatments can be considered as identical and solely dier by the frame changing. In both treatments, we have xed the rst and last decision line to suppress inconsistent choices. 2 (e 10,e 0) (e 1,e 1) (e 0,e -10) (e -9,e -9) 3 (e 10,e 0) (e 2,e 2) (e 0,e -10) (e -8,e -8)
4 (e 10,e 0) (e 3,e 3) (e 0,e -10) (e -7,e -7)
5 (e 10,e 0) (e 4,e 4) (e 0,e -10) (e -6,e -6) 6 (e 10,e 0) (e 5,e 5) (e 0,e -10) (e -5,e -5) 7 (e 10,e 0) (e 6,e 6) (e 0,e -10) (e -4,e -4) 8 (e 10,e 0) (e 7,e 7) (e 0,e -10) (e -3,e -3) 9 (e 10,e 0) (e 8,e 8) (e 0,e -10) (e -2,e -2) 10 (e 10,e 0) (e 9,e 9) (e 0,e -10) (e -1,e -1) 11 (e 10,e 0) (e 10,e 10) (e 0,e -10) (e 0,e 0) Note: * Subjects receive an endowment of e 10 to compensate potential negative payos. In both cases, if player A prefers "Left" for a certain line (amount e X), the computer automatically proposes the same choice for the lines lower than X. Similarly, if player A prefers "Right" for a certain line (e X), the computer proposes player A automatically the same alternative for the adjacent lines higher than X. We require subjects to choose "Left" for the amount X equal to e -10 (e 0) and "Right" for the amount X equal to e 0 (e 10).
One needs to bear in mind that any dierence between the two treatments could be attributed to the eect of the frame changing for one owns payos, the frame changing for the other player's payos or a combination of both. Ideally, switching treatments to the loss frame while the dictator changes to the loss frame and the recipient stays in the gain frame or the dictator remains in the gain frame while the recipient changes to the loss frame would tease out which of the two variations is causing the results. The comparison of our two treatments does not allow to disentangle the eect of loss aversion from frame changing.
Procedures
Table 2 presents summary design information 2 . We consider a between-subject design and implement two distinct treatments which dier according to the framing: either gain or loss. As presented above, we used data from two samples of experiments that were run in the Economic Experimental Laboratory at the University of Strasbourg (France).
In both experiments, subjects start by playing a MDG but after this rst task, several other tasks follow which were not known by the subjects at the time of playing the MDG.
In Attanasi et al. (2016) , there were in total three tasks: (i) elicitation of advantageous inequality aversion, (ii) risk aversion, and (iii) a strategic game. Lampach et al. (2016) introduced four tasks in the experiment: (i) elicitation of advantageous inequality aversion, (ii) risk aversion, (iii) ambiguity aversion and (iv) a liability game. Subjects did not receive any feedback or payment until the end of the experiment. All decisions were to be made as the role of dictator, without any information on other subjects' choices, and without any communication. At the end of the session, each task counted for the calculation of the gains and subjects were paid according to their decisions in the tasks. At the end of the experiment, in the MDG, one of the 11 payo vector pairs is randomly chosen to determine the payment. Each subject is also randomly assigned the role of the dictator or the recipient. This role uncertainty could aect subjects' behavior. Iriberri ( Charness and Grosskopf, 2001 ). In our case this might not be a problem since role uncertainty is present in our two treatments.
We run eight sessions per treatment with 20 subjects each. Subjects were recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and we made sure that subjects did not participate in both studies. The two experiments were conducted at two dierent instances in time: T G in Summer and Fall 2013 and T L in Fall 2015. In total, we gather 160 independent observations per treatment.
Theoretical predictions
Let us assume that the dictator behaves according to a piecewise linear preferences function exhibiting inequality aversion à la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) : In our experiment, we seek to elicit the guilt parameter β when individuals face either negative or positive outcomes. We derive the distribution of β from the MDG responder decisions. We measure exact values for β i such that the dictator is indierent between two allocations, the egalitarian (x i , x i ) and unfair allocation (x i , x j ) where x i > x j . We provide a point estimate for β where an individual switches to the egalitarian outcome at (x i , x i ). If an individual switches at the point (x i , x i ), it means that the person prefers the egalitarian (x i , x i ) over the unfair distribution (x i , x j ). For instance, an individual switches to the egalitarian outcome at (x i , x i ). This means that the individual prefers the unfair allocation (x i , x j ) over the egalitarian outcome (x i − 1,
Similarly to Blanco et al. (2011) , in the gain framed treatment, we solve for the guilt parameter β G i when the individual is indierent between the unfair (x i , x j ) and egalitarian distribution (x G ,x G ) wherex G ∈ [x i − 1, x i ] and x i ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. The superscript "G" denotes the gain framed treatment. From equation (1)
With x i = 10 and x j = 0 then equation (2) can be re-written:
In the loss framed treatment, if we assume that individuals process losses dierently from gains due to the perception of a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Thaler, 1991; K®szegi and Rabin, 2006; Köbberling and Wakker, 2005) , thus the value of β may be dierent than what we obtain in the gain domain. More particularly, if individuals experience loss aversion such that they try to avoid a loss more than they will do to pursue a gain, according to Tversky and Kahneman (1992) , the utility can be represented as a composition of a loss aversion index λ and the basic utility function U such that the utility of a loss x is given by U (−x) = −λU (x). Loss aversion implies that λ is bigger than one reecting the fact that losses count for more than gains in terms of utility.
We solve for the guilt parameter β L i while assuming loss aversion when the individual is indierent between the unfair (x i , x j ) and egalitarian distribution (x L ,x L ) wherex L ∈ [x i − 1, x i ] and x i ∈ {−9, . . . , 0}. Assuming piecewise linear utility function, we consider a model where the dictator values the negative outcomes x at λx 4 . From equation (1),
where the superscript "L" denotes the loss framed treatment. With x i = 0 and x j = −10, it follows from equation (4):
. When λ > 1, it means that losses are overvalued relative to gains. The comparison of (5) with (3) yields that the guilt parameter in the loss frame will be lower than in the gain frame for the same monetary amount |x i |. An individual might feel very guilty for leaving the other person with a high loss. If λ = 1, gains and losses are valued equally, the guilt parameter will be the same in the loss as in the gain frame.
Hence, we expect the guilt parameter to be lower in the loss frame than in the gain frame. This is not because individuals perceive a dierent level of inequality aversion in both frames, but due to loss aversion inducing a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. It thus implies a change on the amount individuals are willing to give up for another person. Individuals will be more reluctant in the loss than in the gain frame to sacrice money in order to achieve an equal distribution of outcomes. In Table 3 , we compare the distributions of guilt parameter as derived in our results and for the sake of comparison in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and in Blanco et al. (2011) .
Empirical results
While our results are fairly comparable with Blanco et al. (2011) , we shall stress that the results in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are obtained with an ultimatum game. As we have already stressed above, the possibility of strategic behavior make the results hardly comparable. 
According to a Chi-square goodness of t test, the distribution of the data in the gain frame diers signicantly from both Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) intervals (χ 2 = 23.23, df = 2, p value < 0.001) and Blanco et al. (2011) (χ 2 = 11.62, df = 2, p value = 0.003).
With regard to the loss frame, we nd that there is no signicant dierences between our data and the intervals of Fehr and Schmidt (χ 2 = 11.62, df = 2, p value = 0.770) and a signicant dierences at the 10% level between our data and those of Blanco et al. Unexpectedly the β distribution in the loss frame is consistent with the one chosen in Fehr and Schmidt. Nevertheless, as pointed by Blanco et al. (2011) the distinction between strategic and non-strategic situation makes it dicult to directly compare our data distribution with the intervals of guilt parameter as derived by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Furthermore, our nding systematically diers from Buchan et al. (2005); Leliveld et al. (2009) and Zhou and Wu (2011) who found that subjects have a higher demand for fairness when they have to share losses with others. Similarly, their ndings have been obtained by applying an ultimatum game to determine disadvantageous inequality aversion by measuring responders' rejection rate.
5 Blanco et al. (2011) uses a much smaller sample size (n=62) compared to T G (n=160). A recent paper by Button et al. (2013) stresses that low statistical power due to small sample size of studies negatively aects the likelihood that the statistically signicant results reect a true eect. Larger sample size reduces the likelihood of encountering the occurrence of Type-I and II errors if the experimental design is carefully constructed and no other problems occur. Furthermore, a higher sample size increases the condence of the results. Since it is expected that the larger the sample size, the more accurately it reects the behavior of the whole group. in general more inequality averse than men (see i.e. (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Dickinson and Tiefenthaler, 2002; Dufwenberg and Astri, 2005; Croson and Gneezy, 2009) ). In Figure 2 , we compare the distribution of the guilt parameter (β i ) between men and women in the gain and loss frame. The fairness preferences of women dier to a large extend from those of men. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test indicates signicant dierences between women and men in the gain frame (p value = 0.003) and in the loss frame treatment (p value < 0.001). This result is in line with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Dickinson and Tiefenthaler (2002) who also nd that women are more concerned about achieving equal outcomes between two parties.
Finally in Table 4 we implement a multiple regression analysis to explore the determinants inuencing individual's fairness preferences. We report cluster robust standard errors to control for individual heterogeneity among both samples (Cameron and Miller, 2015) . 
Conclusion
Monetary losses are encountered in many economic situations as well as in social dilemmas. Understanding the nature of social preferences in the domain of losses is therefore highly relevant to uncover important characteristics of individual behavior. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of other-regarding preferences by providing new evidence on inequality aversion when the decision is framed with losses.
Our results suggest that individuals tend to dislike inequality more in the gain than in the loss frame. Dierences in levels of inequality between both treatments can partly be explained by loss aversion. In this case, individuals value prospective losses with greater sensitivity relative to a reference point and this might drive them towards a more unfair behavior. In line with the literature, our ndings reveal that women are more inequality averse than men.
These results may have substantial implications for decision making in which allocation and distribution rules matter. For instance, in the case of family law, equality should be less important to individuals in the situation of splitting liabilities than dividing assets. Also when negotiated over losses rather gains, bargaining outcomes are likely to be dierent. This has important implications in real-life situations as gain-loss frames can induce dierent responses in bargaining behavior and negotiated outcomes (Schweitzer and DeChruch, 2001; Carnevale, 2008) .
However our design has some limitations. We have not elicited the degree of loss aversion, nor can we distinguish whether it is the change in the framing or the loss aversion that aect individuals' level of inequality aversion. To gain a better understanding on how frames inuence individuals' social preferences, it might be desirable to conduct multiple experiments with dierent individuals from diverse backgrounds and demographics.
Furthermore, the replication of previous experiments might contribute to understanding the robustness and generalizability of individuals' behavior (Deck et al., 2015; Camerer et al., 2016) . Future research could ll this void and a variety of additional games would be useful for studying social preferences.
